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INTRODUCTION 
Through either executive or legislative power, state and local gov-
ernments are rapidly effecting policies that encourage environmental  
sustainability. Many of these policies have logically targeted buildings  
and infrastructure, both of which have a significant adverse impact on  
the environment. In the United States, 38 percent of the nation's car-
bon dioxide emissions and 67 percent of its electricity usage come from  
buildings  .2  New laws and policies are attempting to decrease these  
figures by requiring construction projects to "go green" and implement  
sustainable building practices. These legal initiatives have the poten-
tial to create substantial environmental benefits by reducing energy  
consumption, greenhouse gas emissions, and toxic waste. But in a rush  
to achieve these benefits, many governments have enacted green build-
ing laws that lack a firm constitutional basis.  
This Article explores the constitutionality of green building laws  
that require developers to comply with the sustainable construction rat-
ing system promulgated by the United States Green Building Council  
("USGBC"), a private, non-governmental interest group. The Article  
1 J.D. 2011, William and Mary School of Law; B.A. 2005, magna cum laude, University of  
Richmond. Beginning this fall, Mr. Boxler will clerk for Judge Edward Earl Carnes on the U.S.  
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. Special thanks to Jill for her endless support and the  
editors of the Legislation & Policy Brief  for their hard work preparing this piece for publication.  
2 
 Frequent Questions / Green Building, ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/  
greenbuilding/pubs/faqs.htm (last visited Apr. 23, 2011).  
160 	 "GOING GREEN" THE WRONG WAY  
reviews how the USGBC creates the standards for its rating system  
and then modifies these standards without gaining approval from any  
governmental body, thereby changing the legal rules with which pri-
vate citizens and constructors must comply. The Article argues that,  
because the USGBC can unilaterally change the law, many green build-
ing policies undermine political accountability and violate the doctrine  
of nondelegation. The Article concludes by proposing several ways  
that governments can enact green building policies without unconsti-
tutionally delegating legislative power or circumventing principles of  
democratic governance.  
1. INCREASED ENVIRONMENTAL AWARENESS  
The environmental conservation movement is booming.  
Documentaries such as former Vice President Al Gore's  An Inconvenient 
Truth have contributed to the movement's momentum, and grassroots  
lobbying has also played a significant role in giving the movement  
mainstream appeal . 3  Environmentalist interest groups are well orga-
nized, and their ability to mobilize supporters has given them substan-
tial influence over the political process  .4  In recent years, this influence  
has grown as environmentalists have supplemented grassroots lob-
bying with a more traditional and perhaps more powerful technique:  
campaign contributions. In 2004, environmental interest groups  
contributed $2.2 million to political candidates; in 2008, that number  
jumped to $5.5 million.5 
A recent development in the environmental conservation move-
ment is the push for legislation that encourages or mandates "green  
building," which "is the practice of creating structures and using pro-
cesses that are environmentally responsible ...." 6 Green buildings 
are designed to diminish their adverse environmental impact by "effi-
ciently using energy, water, and other resources ." '  To achieve these  
goals, engineers and constructors use sustainable materials and imple- 
3 ALAN ROSENTHAL, THE DECLINE OF REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY: PROCESS, PARTICIPATION, AND  
POWER IN STATE LEGISLATURES 230 (1988). 
4 Id. 
5 
 Environment: Long-Term Contribution Trends , CENTER FOR RESPONSIVE POL., http://www.  
opensecrets.org/industries/totals.php?cycle=2010&ind=Q11  (last visited Apr. 22, 2011). Ninety-
five percent of the political contributions in 2008 went to Democrats.  Id. 
6 Basic Information / Green Building , ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/  
greenbuilding/pubs/about.htm#1 (last visited Apr. 21, 2011).  
'  Id. ; see also Christopher P. Perzan, Environmental Protection: What You Should Know About Green 
Building, 20 CHI. BAR ASS'N REC. 38, 39 (Nov. 2006) ("Green design, whether in the context of  
building construction, product design manufacturing, or some other area, is design that seeks to  
maximize energy efficiency, minimize resource use and waste production, reduce or eliminate  
toxic materials in building components, and reduce the overall impact of the building on the  
environment.").  
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ment advanced technologies to build and maintain structures with  
minimal waste a 
Similar to the broader environmentalist movement, the popularity  
of green building is growing. 9 In 2005, the market for green build-
ing products and services was approximately $7 billion. 10 This num-
ber is expected to increase to more than $173.5 billion by the end of  
201511 —a remarkable 2,379 percent increase in only 10 years. Some  
of this growth is due to an unprecedented level of governmental ini-
tiatives that promote or mandate green construction, often passed at  
the urging of the environmentalist lobby. 12 All but one of the twenty-
five most populated metropolitan regions in the United States are now  
built around cities with formal green building policies, 13  and all but  
five states have adopted initiatives to encourage sustainable construc- 
I 
 See Sara C. Bronin, The Quiet Revolution Revived: Sustainable Design, Land Use Regulation, and the  
States, 93 MINN. L. REV. 231, 241-42 (2008). 
9 See, e.g., David Knopf, Green Homebuilding Gaining Popularity Among Consumers, Builders, Experts  
Say, KAN. CITY STAR, Feb. 20, 2008, at LB5 (discussing growth in the green home marketplace);  see 
also Erin Madison, Commercial Buildings More Energy-Efficient as the Greening of Great Falls Blossoms , 
GREAT FALLS TRIB. (Mont.), at B1, Nov. 22, 2009, available at http://www.greatfallstribune.com/  
article/20091122/BUSINESS/911220304/Commercial+buildings+more+energy-efficient+as+the+gr 
 
eening+of+Great+Falls+blossoms (describing how "[g]reen commercial construction is becoming  
increasingly popular").  
10 
 About USGBC , USGBC, http://www.usgbc.org/DisplayPage.aspx?CMSPageID=124  (last visited  
Apr. 22, 2011). 
11 
 Green Building Market To Hit $173.5 Billion by 2015 , ENVTL. LEADER, July 1, 2010, http://www.  
environmentalleader.com/2010/07/01/green-building-market-to-hit-173-5-billion-by-2015/; 
 
cf. The Green Building Market and Impact Report 2009 , GREENBUILDINGS.COM, Nov. 5, 2009, http://  
www.greenbiz.com/buildings/research/report/2009/11/05/green-building-market-and-impact-
report-2009 ("Green building activity has sustained impressive growth during 2009, amid a  
brutal construction market that has decimated other segments of the construction marketplace.").  
See generally Keith H. Hirokawa, At Home with Nature: Early Reflections on Green Building Laws  
and the Transformation of the Built Environment , 39 ENVTL. L. 507, 509-10 (2009) (noting that the  
rise in popularity of the "green building movement" has exceeded "virtually all predictions and  
expectations of its potential").  
12 
 See, e.g. , 2009 Conservation LobbyDay , MO. VOTES CONSERVATION, http://www.movotesconservation.  
org/lobbyday.aspx (last visited July 29, 2010) (discussing a "Conservation Lobby Day" where  
environmentalist groups lobbied over ninety state legislators to support conservationist policies,  
including green building laws); ECRI Legislative Priorities for 2009 in the RI General Assembly , ENV^T 
COUNCIL R.I., http://www.environmentcouncilri.org/news.html 
 (last visited July 30, 2010) (listing  
"Promote Green Buildings" as a lobbying priority for the upcoming legislative session).  But see  
Bronin, supra note 7, at 260 (arguing that local interest groups, such as unions and manufacturers  
of conventional building materials, may prevent city governments from enacting green building  
policies). 
13 
 American Cities Embrace Green Buildings , ENV'T NEWS SERVICE, Nov. 16, 2009, http://www.ens-
newswire.com/ens/nov2009/2009-11-16-091.asp;  cf. 
 BROOKS RAINWATER, AM. INST. ARCHITECTS,  
LOCAL LEADERS IN SUSTAINABILITY: A STUDY OF GREEN BUILDING PROGRAMS IN OUR NATION'S  
COMMUNITIES 4 (2008), available at  http://green.e-arc.com/images/Green-Building-Study.pdf  
(reporting that at least 14 percent of all cities with populations over 50,000 have green building  
programs).  
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tion practices. 14 Put simply, the country is in the middle of a "green  
building revolution." 15 
11. THE LEED RATING SYSTEM  
In response to the increased public and political interest in sus-
tainable construction, several organizations formed to standardize  
and promote green building techniques. None has been more influ-
ential than the USGBC, 16  a private non-profit organization based in  
Washington, D.C. 17 The USGBC promulgates an internationally rec-
ognized set of standards for environmentally sustainable construc-
tion called the Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design Green  
Building Rating System ("LEED"). 18 A building may achieve one of  
four hierarchical LEED ratings —"Certificate Level" to "Platinum  
Level" —depending on the amount of points it receives. 19 Builders earn  
points by incorporating green construction and design strategies into a  
project's completion. 20 
Gaining LEED certification is not easy. Green technologies often cost  
more than the materials traditionally used on construction projects, 21 
and green builders must pay additional design, consulting, and cer-
tification fees to achieve a LEED rating . 22  Depending on the level of  
certification sought, these added costs range from one to ten percent,  
which can mean millions of dollars for larger commercial projects. 23 
The payoff, however, can also be significant. 24 Research indicates that  
14 See Public Policies Adopting or Referencing LEED , USGBC, http://www.usgbc.org/DisplayPage . 
aspx?CMSPageID=1852 (last visited Jan. 22, 2011) (proffering that forty-five states have LEED  
initiatives, including "legislation, executive orders, resolutions, ordinances, policies, and  
incentives").  
15 
 See Susan Carpenter,  Al Gore Calls fora Green Building Revolution , L.A. TIMES, Nov. 12, 2009, http://  
latimesblogs.latimes.com/home_blog/2009/11/al-gore-calls-for-a-green-building-revolution.html  
(describing a speech by the Vice President calling for a green revolution).  
16 
 See  Perzan, supra note 6, at 39; see also Brian D. Anderson, Legal and Business Issues of Green 
Building, 79 Wis. LAw.10,12 (2006) ("[T]he USGBC has virtually cornered the market on the rating  
of green commercial buildings.").  
17 USGBC, http://www.usgbc.org/ (last visited Apr. 24, 2011) . 
11 
 Perzan, supra  note 6, at 39 ("The USGBC has established a set of standards known as the ...  
LEED."); see also Anderson, supra note 15, at 12-13 (detailing the creation of LEED).  
19 USGBC, LEED 2009 FOR NEW CONSTRUCTION AND MAJOR RENOVATIONS vii (2009).  
20 
 Id. at vi-vii; see also Perzan, supra  note 6, at 39 (discussing the point categories of the LEED  
rating system).  
21 
 Benjamin S. Kingsley, Note,  Making it Easy To Be Green: Using Impact Fees To Encourage Green  
Building, 83 N.Y.U. L. REv. 532, 538-40 (2008).  
22 
 Id. at 539. 
23 
 Id. 
24 
 See Perzan, supra note 6, at 39 (discussing how the cost savings of green buildings, such as  
improved energy efficiency, "can help developers recoup the initial costs over a fairly short period  
of time"); see also Stuart D. Kaplow, Does a Green Building Need a Green Lease?, 38 U. BALT. L. REv. 
375, 377-79 (2009) (noting that LEED buildings can command a higher rental rate and sell for more  
money per square foot than non-LEED properties, and explaining the "dollars and cents case" to  
justify construction of green buildings).  
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LEED certification improves a building's value, long-term operating  
expenses, and occupancy rates. 25 
Due in part to these long-term cost savings, many private com-
panies became interested in green buildings around the turn of the  
twenty-first century when the USGBC first published the LEED rat-
ing system. 26 Another, more cynical reason for this interest was the  
positive publicity that attends green building projects. 27  Companies  
recognized that constructing LEED-certified buildings often attracted  
favorable media attention that could improve their corporate images.  
In addition to creating workplaces that were certified to be "environ-
mentally responsible, profitable, and healthy," businesses also gained  
new marketing tools to sell their corporate brand to consumers who  
were becoming increasingly environmentally aware. 28 By 2003, busi-
nesses such as the Ford Motor Company and Warner Brothers were  
vying for the honor and publicity of constructing "the world's greenest  
building."29 
111. LEGISLATIVE INITIATIVES  
It did not take long for lawmakers to recognize the fiscal, public  
relations, and political advantages of supporting and ultimately enact- 
25 
 See  Stephen T. Del Percio, Comment, The Skyscraper, Green Design, & the LEED Green Building  
Rating System: The Creation of Uniform Sustainable Standards for the 21st Century or the Perpetuation  
of an Architectural Fiction?, 28 ENVIRONS. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y J.117, 135-36 (2004);  see also Andrew C.  
Burr, CoStar Study Finds Energy Start, LEED Bldgs. Outperform Peers , COSTAR GROUP, Mar. 26, 2008,  
http://www.costar.com/News/Article/CoStar-Study-Finds-Energy-Star-LEED-Bldgs-Outperform-
Peers/99818 (reporting that LEED-certified buildings "command rent premiums of $11.33 per  
square foot over their non-LEED peers and have 4.1 percent higher occupancy"); Janet Frankston,  
Emory University Sees 'Green' Building as Good Investment , ATLANTA J. CONST., Mar. 15, 2004, http://  
www.accessmylibrary.com/article-1G1-118628769/emory-university-sees-green.html 
 ("Emory  
spent an extra $570,000 to make its new Whitehead biomedical research building environmentally  
friendly, but the university expects to get that money back within six years.");  Green Buildings 
Bring Higher Rental Rates, Burnham-Moores Center Study Finds , DAILY COM. NEWS, Feb. 15, 2008,  
http://dcnonl.com/article/id26427. 
 
26 
 Barnaby J. Federer, Environmentally Conscious Developers Try To Turn Green Into Platinum , N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 25, 2004, http://www.nytimes.com/2004/08/25/business/commercial-real-estate-
environmentally-conscious-developers-try-turn-green-into.html; 
 see also Peter Lehner, Changing 
Markets To Address Climate Change , 35 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 385, 386-88 (2008) (discussing the  
various ways that corporations have focused on becoming more responsible environmental  
actors).  
27 
 See, e.g. , Giant Eagle Becomes First LEED-Certified Supermarket in the U.S. Brunswick Store  
Earns First Environmentally Friendly Supermarket Designation, PR NEWSWIRE, Dec. 22, 2004, http://  
www.accessmylibrary.com/coms2/summary_0286-18300784_TTM; Lake Champlain Chocolates 
Opens LEED-Certified Packaging & Distribution Facility, Bus. WIRE, Sept. 19, 2006, http://www.  
businesswire.com/news/google/20060919005076/en;  Office Depot To Build LEED-Certified Store , 
MORTGAGE BANKING, Nov. 1, 2007, http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-172556560.html. 
 
28 
 Building a Green Business Future, CABLE NEWS NETWORK, July 13, 2004, http://www.cnn.com/2004/  
BUSINESS/07/08/go.greenbuildings/index.html.  
29 
 Id. The Staples store chain provides a more recent example. The company has refocused its  
brand identity on environmental sustainability with the goal of attracting a broader consumer base  
by building "brand equity over a long period of time."  How Staples Is Building a Sustainable Brand, 
BRANDWEEK, Nov. 5, 2009, http://www.brandweek.com/bw/content_display/news-and-features/ 
 
direct/e3ib17430d49aa1ec38e9b3d409cb58faf9. 
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ing sustainable building policies. 30 Within ten years of LEED's prom-
ulgation, more than thirty states had enacted policies to encourage or  
mandate some form of green building. 31 Local governments have expe-
rienced a similar wave of green building momentum; in 2008 alone,  
several hundred cities and municipalities implemented sustainable  
construction policies .32  Anchorage, Annapolis, Cambridge, and San  
Francisco are just a few cities that now require certain construction  
projects to comply with LEED standards. 33 
Rhode Island is one of the states that has recently enacted a green  
building statute. In November 2009, Governor Donald Carcieri signed  
into law the Green Buildings Act, which provides that "[a]ll major  
facility projects of public agencies shall be designed and constructed  
to at least the LEED certified or an equivalent high performance green  
building standard." 34 Rhode Island's law is similar to the green build-
ing statutes of other jurisdictions. 35 
Another way that states have enacted green building policies is  
through executive orders. Former Virginia Governor Tim Kaine, for  
example, signed an executive order requiring all new government  
buildings greater than 5,000 square feet to conform with LEED silver  
certification standards. 36  Governors in Arizona, 37 Florida, 38 and other  
30 Cf. Bronin, supra note 7, at 246-47 (discussing the various reasons why governments would  
want to incorporate green building strategies into public projects).  
31 
 See Government Resources , USGBC, http://www.usgbc.org/DisplayPage.aspx?CMSPageID=1779  
(last visited Apr. 22, 2011) (noting that forty-five states have LEED initiatives);  see also Bronin, supra  
note 7, at 268 (discussing the financial incentives states have created to encourage sustainable  
building initiatives); Stephen Del Percio,  Revisiting  Allied Tube and Noerr: The Antitrust Implications 
of Green Building Legislation M Case Law Considerations for Policymakers , 34 WM. & MARY ENvTL. L. & 
POL'Y REv. 239, 239 (2009) ("Over the past five years, green building legislation has been enacted  
across the country at the state and local levels with heightened frequency to combat what many  
legislators and their constituents believe to be an imminent threat resulting from global climate  
change."); cf. Perzan, supra note 6, at 43 ("The pace at which the development and adoption of the  
green building standards has occurred is remarkable.").  
32 
 See  Kaplow, supra note 24, at 381 & n.38.  
33 
 ANCHORAGE, ALASKA, MUN. CODE tit. 23.05.050 (2008); ANNAPOLIS, MD., MUN. CODE tit. 17, ch.  
17.14.040 (2010); CAMBRIDGE, MASS., MUN. CODE art. 22.000 (2010); S.F., CAL., BUILDING CODE ch.  
13C, § 1303C101.3 (2010).  
34 R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 37-24-1 (Supp. 2010).  
35 
 Oklahoma, for example, requires all public buildings over 10,000 square feet to follow LEED  
guidelines or a similar green building standard. OKLA. STAT. tit. 61, § 213 (2009). Similarly,  
Washington requires all public projects, regardless of size, to "be designed, constructed, and  
certified to at least the LEED silver standard." WASH. REV. CODE. ANN. § 39.35D.030 (West Supp.  
2010). 
36 
 Va. Exec. Order No. 82, June 10, 2009.  
37 
 Ariz. Exec. Order No. 2005-05, Feb. 11, 2005 (requiring all state-funded buildings to achieve  
LEED silver certification).  
36 
 Fla. Exec. Order No. 07-126, July 13, 2007 (requiring all new public construction projects to  
meet LEED platinum certification).  
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states39 have issued similar orders directing new publicly-funded con-
struction projects to achieve some form of LEED certification. 40 
IV. DELEGATING LAWMAKING POWER TO THE USGBC  
The states' recent flood of green policymaking is admirable, yet it is  
also imperfect. As more states and localities rush to enact or strengthen  
green building laws, legislators often overlook the importance of care-
fully constructing these statutes. Many governments, for example,  
have passed laws that establish a system of penalties and incentives  
for privately constructed buildings that achieve or fail to achieve LEED  
certification. The problem with these statutes is that the LEED rating  
system is created and updated by a non-governmental organization:  
the USGBC. Thus, the USGBC has the power to alter a statutory scheme  
that awards or penalizes citizens based on the LEED rating system. In  
other words, the USGBC has the power to change  the law . 
Consider New Mexico's green building statute. It provides a "sus-
tainable building tax credit" to all LEED-certified commercial and resi-
dential construction projects . 41  Commercial buildings that reach LEED  
silver certification receive a $3.50 tax credit per square foot for the first  
10,000 feet. 42 If the commercial building reaches platinum certification,  
the tax credit nearly doubles. 43 The New Mexico statute provides an  
39 See, e.g. , Ind. Exec. Order No. 08-14, June 24, 2008 (requiring all new state buildings to achieve  
LEED silver certification); Mich. Exec. Order No. 2005-4, Apr. 22, 2005 (requiring all state-funded  
construction to satisfy LEED guidelines); R.I. Exec. Order No. 05-14, Aug. 22, 2005 (requiring all  
new construction and renovations of public schools to achieve LEED silver certification).  
40 
 Relatedly, another author has suggested that there are "potential antitrust implications of  
adopting the LEED rating system into state and local level legislation." Del Percio,  supra  note  
31, at 242. This argument is rooted in the fact that LEED, like other rating systems, excludes  
certain types of products, materials, and industries from its compliance requirements. Thus,  
according to Del Percio, when governments require newly constructed buildings to receive LEED  
certification, they "enshrin[e] these biases into legislation." Stephen T. Del Percio,  Legal Issues 
Arising Out of Green Building Legislation , ENTREPRENEUR, http://entrepreneur.com/tradejournals/  
article/192452490_2.html (last visited Apr. 25, 2011). Although a full analysis of Del Percio's  
argument is beyond the scope of this Article, it is worth noting that official government actions  
are immune from antitrust liability  even if  they unreasonably restrain trade. Parker v. Brown,  
317 U.S. 341, 368 (1942);  see also Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Adver., Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 379 (1991);  
Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558, 579-80 (1984). The incorporation of LEED standards into state  
law is a governmental action that would receive this immunity. And because government actions  
are immune from antitrust liability, they cannot be used to buttress an antitrust claim against a  
private organization, as Del Percio suggests. Private and public actions are siloed for the purpose  
of antitrust analyses. See Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 500  
(1988) (holding that a Clayton Act plaintiff could receive damages for the anticompetitive actions  
that a private organization performed when  drafting a model electric code, but that "no damages  
[may be] imposed for the  incorporation  of that Code by any government") (emphasis added);  see 
also Mass. Sch. of Law at Andover, Inc. v. ABA, 107 F.3d 1026, 1036 n.8 (3d Cir. 1997) (explaining  
that the Allied  Court "specifically excluded from consideration  any injury resulting from the  adoption  
of the challenged standards by any government and dealt  only with the independent marketplace  
effect of the defendant's conduct") (emphasis added).  
41 N.M. STAT. ANN. § 7-2-18.19 (West Supp. 2010).  
42 
 Id. § 7-2-18.19(C).  
43 
 Id. 
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even greater incentive to taxpayers constructing new residential prop-
erties: LEED silver buildings receive a $5.00 per square foot tax credit;  
platinum certification is worth $9.00 per square foot. 44  Other state  
green building statutes are similar to New Mexico's, and incentivize  
or penalize private actors based on whether their construction projects  
achieve a particular LEED rating 45 
The District of Columbia's Green Building Act also deserves a brief  
mention.46 
 Starting in 2012, this Act will require all private develop-
ment projects to furnish surety performance bonds to the District in an  
amount up to $3 million . 47  If the project fails to achieve LEED certifi-
cation, the bond is forfeited to the District as a penalty. 48 This statute  
may establish the country's largest fiscal penalty for new construction  
projects that do not comply with LEED standards. 49 
The problem with these laws that operate contingently upon LEED  
certification is that LEED standards change. 50 "As new methods of  
recycling, materials reuse, and energy conservation are developed,  
the design of green buildings will also change." 51 The USGBC fre-
quently alters its rating system to reflect these new scientific advanc-
es. 52 
 Accordingly, what a building must accomplish to achieve LEED  
certification varies from year to year. These variations  de facto alter the  
legal standards of green building laws that mandate LEED compliance.  
Many states and localities, therefore, have delegated to the USGBC the  
unencumbered power to change the law. Such delegations are not only  
bad public policy, they are often unconstitutional.  
44 
 Id. § 7-2-18.19(D).  
45 
 See, e.g. , CONN. GEN. STAT. § 12-217mm (Supp. 2010) (creating a tax credit for all "new construction  
or major renovation of a building ... certified by the LEED Green Building Rating System"); N.C.  
GEN. STAT. § 153A-340 (2010) (authorizing cities and counties to create fees and rebates for new  
building construction projects in order to "encourage construction that uses sustainable design  
principles"); N.Y. PUB. AUTH. LAw § 1872 (McKinney Supp. 2011) (creating a "green residential  
building program" that provides grants and "incentive payments" to residential building owners  
who achieve certain LEED certifications); VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-3221.2 (2010) (requiring localities  
to tax energy efficient buildings at a lower rate).  
46 
 D.C. CODE § 6-1451.01-6-1451.11 (2009).  
47 
 Id. § 6-1451.05.  
48 
 See id. See generally  Chris Cheatham, White Paper: Revisions to Performance Bond Requirement of the  
D.C. Green Building Act  (2009), available at http://www.greenbuildinglawupdate.com/uploads/file/  
DC%20White%20Paper%20FINAL%20PDF.pdf (discussing the virtues and vices of the District's  
performance bond enforcement mechanism).  
49 
 See  Eujung Park, The U.S. Federal Green Building Policy, 8 SUSTAINABLE DEv. L. & POL'Y 71, 71  
(2007). 
50 See  Sarah B. Schindler,  Following Industry's LEED: Municipal Adoption of Private Green Building  
Standards, 62 FLA. L. REV. 285,344 (2010) ("The USGBC's LEED standards are not static.").  
51 
 Id. 
52 
 See LEED Rating System Development , USGBC, https://www.usgbc.org/ShowFile . 
aspx?DocumentID=8447 ("The hallmark of LEED and its ability to affect market transformation  
is its continuous improvement cycle that enables the rating system to increase in scope and  
stringency as market readiness increases and new technologies become widely available.") (last  
visited Apr. 26, 2011).  
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V. CONSTITUTIONAL AND PUBLIC POLICY CONCERNS 
A. THE "WELL ESTABLISHED" RULE AGAINST PRIVATE DELEGATION  
Ever since Carter v. Carter Coal Co.,53  courts have consistently  
accepted the constitutionality of federal government delegations to  
private actors . 54  The U.S. Supreme Court, for example, upheld the  
constitutionality of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, 55 which 
gave crop producers the power to block or approve federally recom-
mended quotas. 56  Similarly, the D.C. Circuit rejected a challenge to  
the Davis-Bacon Act, 57  which required government contractors to pay  
their workers an hourly wage at or above the rate that the local union  
established. 58 
 
State and local government delegations, by contrast, continue to  
undergo searching judicial scrutiny. 59 Many state courts have invali-
dated private delegations that survived, or would survive, federal  
court review. 60 The Arizona Supreme Court, for example, invalidated  
the state's "Little Davis-Bacon Act," which charged a private commis-
sion with the responsibility of setting a wage rate that contractors on  
state public works projects must pay their employees . 61  The court rea-
soned that "[i]t is a well established theory that a legislature may not  
delegate its authority to private persons over whom the legislature has  
no supervision or control." 62 Thus, because the legislature retained no  
control over the commission's wage determinations, the statute was an  
"unlawful delegation of legislative power." 63 
53 
 298 U.S. 238, 311 (1935) (invalidating a statute that delegated power to producers and miners  
to fix hours and wages because the delegation was "so clearly arbitrary, and so clearly a denial of  
rights safeguarded by the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment").  
54 
 But cf.  S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 560 (1997) (Brennan, J.,  
dissenting) ("The Government is free, of course, to 'privatize' some functions it would otherwise  
perform. But such privatization ought not automatically release those who perform government  
functions from constitutional obligations.").  
55 
 Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, 7 U.S.C. §§ 1281-1407 (2006).  
56 
 See Mulford v. Smith, 307 U.S. 38, 43 (1939) (noting that a quota proclamation will not go into  
effect if it is opposed by at least one-third of crop producers).  
57 
 40 U.S.C. § 276(a) (1982). 
58 
 See Bldg. & Constr. Trades Dept. AFL-CIO v. Donovan, 712 F.2d 611 (D.C. Cir.1983).  
59 See, e.g. , FM Props. Operating Co. v. City of Austin, 22 S.W.3d 868 (Tex. 2000) (declaring  
unconstitutional portions of the Texas Water Code that delegated legislative powers to private  
landowners).  
60 
 Cf. A. Michael Froomkin, Wrong Turn in Cyberspace: Using ICANN To Route Around the APA  
and the Constitution, 50 DUKE L.J. 17, 155-56 (2000) (observing that "the Supreme Court has had  
no modern opportunities" to strengthen the private nondelegation doctrine since  Carter Coal, but 
noting that many state courts have "recently reaffirmed the importance of the doctrine").  
61 
 Indus. Comm'n of Ariz. v. C & D Pipeline, Inc., 607 P.2d 383,384 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1979).  
62 Id. at 385. 
63 
 Id. at 386; see also Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp. v. White Cross Stores, Inc., 199 A.2d 266,  
267-68 (Pa. 1964) ("Price regulatory power vests only in the elected legislative body. It may in  
limited ways be delegated to other responsible governmental agencies, such as public service  
or utility commissions .... However, it may not be delegated to private persons. The vesting  
of a discretionary regulatory power over prices, rates or wages, in private persons violates the  
essential concept of a democratic society and is constitutionally invalid.").  But see  Kenai Peninsula  
Borough Sch. Dist. v. Kenai Peninsula Educ. Ass'n, 572 P.2d 416,420 (Alaska 1977) ("While courts  
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The Arizona Supreme Court decision is notable because it provided  
no specific constitutional basis for invalidating the legislature's private  
delegation. The court simply struck down the statute because it vio-
lated a "well established" rule against governmental delegations to  
private actors. 64  This judicial approach is consistent with that of other  
state courts, which rarely cite to a specific constitutional source when  
invalidating private legislative delegations. 65 Rather, these courts are  
wary of such delegations because private actors are politically unac-
countable for the choices they make with the public power delegated  
to them 66 
Green building laws that require compliance with the LEED rating  
system are thus not necessarily invalid because they violate a particu-
lar clause of a state constitution. Instead, the problem with such stat-
utes is that they circumvent the principles of political accountability  
that are essential to democratic governance. Put another way, these  
green building laws may not directly violate a constitutional provision,  
but they are so antithetical to democratic ideals that courts should not  
let them stand.  
This policy rationale makes sense. Members of the USGBC who cre-
ate and promulgate the LEED standards are not public officials. They  
are not elected by the public at large, appointed by a public official, or  
employed by the government in any way. Nor are they subject to the  
Freedom of Information Act or required to create their rating system  
in the open, transparent process that society demands of state actors . 67  
In short, LEED Steering Committee members have little or no account-
ability to the general public. 68 Their charge is simply to develop, main- 
in an earlier era often held laws unconstitutional on the ground that they delegated legislative  
power to private persons or groups ... the trend has been to uphold such delegations, even when  
the power is delegated to a group with an economic interest in the decisions to be made.").  
64 
 Indus. Comm'n of Ariz. , 607 P.2d at 385;  cf.  Thompson v. Smith, 154 S.E. 579, 584 (Va. 1930) 
(stating that the rule prohibiting certain delegations of legislative power is predicated on "a  
fundamental principle of our system of government").  
65 
 See, e.g. , Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Kueckelhan, 425 P.2d 669, 682 (Wash. 1967) (Hale, J., dissenting)  
("The illegality consists ... in a violation of the constitution that designedly protects us from those  
unspecified and unidentifiable hazards to self government lurking in a delivery of the powers of  
government into the hands of private persons or corporations.").  
66 
 Asmara Tekle Johnson, Privatizing Eminent Domain: The Delegation of a Very Public Power to  
Private, Non-Profit, and Charitable Corporations, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 455, 462 (2005).  
67 See  Schindler, supra  note 50, at 342-43; cf.  Jody Freeman, Extending Public Law Norms Through  
Privatization, 116 HARv. L. REV. 1285, 1304 (2003) ("Public law scholars worry that privatization  
may enable government to avoid its traditional legal obligations, leading to an erosion of public  
law norms and a systematic failure of public accountability.").  
68 
 See  Bronin, supra note 7, at 242 ("LEED is run by a non-profit organization with no accountability  
to any level of government for changes that may occur in LEED standards over time.");  see also 
Dan Walters, Private Law Undercuts Democracy, SACRAMENTO BEE, Aug. 6, 2007, at A3 ("[T]he 
standards [the USGBC] decrees and the methods it uses to draft those decrees are matters of its  
internal politics—including influence from those who support it financially—and are shielded  
from input by the outside world.").  
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tain, and update the LEED rating system, 69 not to do what is best for  
"the people."  
This lack of public accountability is the key problem with states  
delegating some of their legislative function to the USGBC. As the  
Texas Supreme Court described when striking down a statute giving a  
private organization the power to levy fines:  
[T]he private delegate may have a personal or pecuniary  
interest which is inconsistent with or repugnant to the  
public interest to be served. More fundamentally, the  
basic concept of democratic rule under a republican  
form of government is compromised when public  
powers are abandoned to those who are neither  
elected by the people, appointed by a public official  
or entity, nor employed by the government. Thus, we  
believe it axiomatic that courts should subject private  
delegations to a more searching scrutiny than their  
public counterparts. 7' 
In sum, poorly crafted green building laws can give the USGBC  
unchecked public powers that defy the political objectives of democratic  
governance.  
B. STATE CONSTITUTION LEGISLATIVE VESTING CLAUSES  
In addition to the "well established" rule against private delega-
tion in the states, 71 some courts source their discontent for private del-
egations in constitutional provisions that vest lawmaking power in the  
state legislature. 72 
 Virginia's constitution is typical: "[t]he legislative  
power of the Commonwealth shall be vested in a General Assembly,  
which shall consist of a Senate and House of Delegates." 73 The Supreme  
Court of Virginia recently relied on this vesting clause when it struck  
down a law delegating the power of taxation to an unelected body. 74 
69 See USGBC: LEED Steering Committee , USGBC, http://www.usgbc.org/DisplayPage . 
aspx?CMSPageID=l636 (last visited Apr. 22, 2011).  
7'  Texas Boll Weevil Eradication Found., Inc. v. Lewellen, 952 S.W.2d 454,469 (Tex. 1997).  
71 
 Indus. Comm'n of Ariz. v. C & D Pipeline, Inc., 607 P.2d 383,385 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1979).  
72 
 See  David M. Lawrence, Private Exercise of Governmental Power, 61 IND. L.J. 647, 650 (1986).  
Due process clauses of state constitutions are another source that courts use to limit private  
delegations. The argument typically advanced is that "[i]f a delegation creates the opportunity  
for private interest to dominate the use of governmental power, then those against whom the  
power is used may well have suffered deprivations without due process."  Id. at 661; see also  
Jordan v. State Bd. of Ins., 334 S.W.2d 278 (Tex. 1960). Other courts source the unconstitutionality  
of private delegations within principles of separation of powers.  See, e.g. , Hous. Auth. of Dallas v. 
Higginbotham, 143 S.W.2d 79 (Tex. 1940).  
73 
 VA. CONST. art. I, § 1; cf. CONN. CONsT. art. III, § 1 ("The legislative power of this state shall be  
vested in two distinct houses or branches; the one to be styled the senate, the other the house of  
representatives, and both together the general assembly.").  
74 Marshall v. N. Va. Transp. Auth., 657 S.E.2d 71, 78-79 (Va. 2008) (holding that the vesting clause  
of the Virginia Constitution permits delegation of taxing authority to only a legislative body of  
elected officials).  
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State constitutional vesting clauses reflect the democratic value that  
"the people" have voluntarily submitted to the power of the legisla-
ture. 75 Thus, when the legislature transfers its lawmaking authority  
to a private organization, the people become bound by laws to which  
they did not voluntarily submit. 76 This transfer of lawmaking power is  
precisely what many green building laws entail.  
Importantly, state constitution vesting clauses do not prohibit leg-
islatures from ever delegating their lawmaking power. Administrative  
law is filled with examples of states constitutionally transferring some  
of their authority to agencies that promulgate rules and regulations. 77 
These delegations, however, are  intragovernmental. Governments may  
delegate their authority to subordinate agencies, offices, or municipali-
ties without violating their state's vesting clause. 78 But when they del-
egate rulemaking authority to a non-governmental body such as the  
USGBC, the legislative power transfers outside the transparent public  
realm and into the opaque private realm. For that reason, private law-
making delegations violate the vesting clause; public delegations do  
not. 79 
One example of the distinction between private and public delega-
tions is Fink v. Cole  . 80  There, New York passed a law that delegated to  
a private association the discretionary power to "license owners, train- 
^5 
 See  JOHN LOcKE, TwO TREATISES Or GOVERNMENT 381-82 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ.  
Press 1960) (1690) ("Political Power is that Power which every Man, having in the state of Nature,  
has given up into the hands of the Society, and therein to the Governours, whom the Society hath  
set over it self ...."); see also Peter H. Aranson et al., A Theory of Legislative Delegation , 68 CORNELL 
L. REV. 1, 4 (1982) ("Locke's insistence that legislators cannot delegate their legislative authority  
derives from an ancient rule of agency law: power entrusted to an agent as a consequence of his  
special fitness cannot be delegated, because such a delegation would be inconsistent with the  
purposes of the initial transfer.").  
76 See  LOcxE, supra note 75, at 382-83 ("[The] power to make Laws ... has its Original only from  
Compact and Agreement, and the mutual Consent of those who make up the Community.");  see 
also People ex rel. Chi. Dryer Co. v. City of Chicago,109 N.E.2d 201, 206 (^ll.1952) ("The legislature  
cannot abdicate its functions or subject citizens and their interests to any but lawfully public  
agencies, and a delegation of any sovereign power of government to private citizens cannot be  
sustained nor their assumption of it justified.").  
77 
 See generally Richard B. Stewart,  Beyond Delegation Doctrine , 36 AM. U. L. REV. 323 (1987)  
(discussing the potential revival of the delegation doctrine).  
78 
 E.g., Marshall, 657 S.E.2d at 79 ("The General Assembly may by special act delegate the power  
of taxation to any county, city, town or regional government.").  
79 
 This discussion of state vesting clauses is admittedly overly simplistic. Some state courts may  
give the government leeway in delegating legislative power to the private sector or may place  
restraints on the government's ability to delegate powers to subordinate government agencies.  
The Commonwealth of Virginia, for example, allows the General Assembly to delegate legislative  
power only if it also provides sufficient guidance for how to use such power.  See, e.g. , Bell v. Dorey  
Elec. Co., 448 S.E.2d 622, 623 (Va. 1994) ("[D]elegations of legislative power are valid only if they  
establish specific policies and fix definite standards to guide the official, agency, or board in the  
exercise of the power."); Ames v. Town of Painter, 389 S.E.2d 702, 703-06 (Va. 1990) (requiring that  
the Board's decision be supported by a record). Regardless, no state green building laws provide  
any guidance to the USGBC, so these limited cases of acceptable delegation are inapposite.  
80 97 N.E.2d 873 (N.Y. 1951).  
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ers, and jockeys at steeplechases and hunts." 81 The New York Supreme  
Court struck down the statute as an "unconstitutional relinquish-
ment of legislative power" 82 because it created "essentially a sovereign  
power" whose members were "neither chosen by, nor responsible to  
the State government." 8' 
 The court went on to explain, however, that  
the legislature's delegation of this licensing power to a governmental  
agency would survive vesting clause scrutiny. 84 
Green building laws fail for the same reason as the statute in  Fink : 
they vest lawmaking power in a private group that is not politically  
accountable to the general public.  Fink is also illustrative because it  
highlights an easy way for states and localities to avoid this constitu-
tional repugnancy—namely, by delegating the power to establish green  
building standards to a subordinate political agency rather than to the  
USGBC. 
VI. BRINGING GREEN BUILDING LAWS WITHIN CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS  
None of this discussion is meant to suggest that governmental reli-
ance on the private sector to assist with setting green building stan-
dards is per se unconstitutional. Indeed, utilizing standards that the  
private sector develops can have substantial public policy benefits, not  
the least of which is flexibility. Bureaucracy typically does not con-
strain private organizations in the same way as it does state and local  
governments. 85 Free from this institutional bondage, private organi-
zations can respond to scientific and technological advances in ways  
that the government cannot. 86 Other policy advantages of using private  
sector standards include reducing partisan political influence, utilizing  
private expertise, and conserving limited public resources. 87  
For these functional reasons, governments frequently turn to the  
private sector to assist with lawmaking . 88  Many states, for example,  
have legislatively adopted a version of the National Electric Code,  
81 Id. at 874. 
12 Id. at 876. 
8' 
 Id. 
'4 See id. (implying that, if the licensing power had been transferred to a governmental agency  
instead of a private corporation, the delegation would not violate the state constitution's vesting  
clause).  
15 
 Harold I. Abramson, A Fifth Branch of Government: The Private Regulators and Their  
Constitutionality, 16 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.165, 180 & n.76 (1989).  
16 
 Lawrence, supra note 72, at 654-59; cf.  Harold J. Krent, Fragmenting the Unitary Executive: 
Congressional Delegations of Administrative Authority Outside the Federal Government , 85 Nw. U.L. 
RE^. 62, 85-86 (1990) (describing the ability to rely on the expertise of private groups as one  
advantage of legislative delegation).  
87 
 Abramson, supra  note 85, at 179-81;  see also Lawrence, supra  note 72, at 656-57 ("The availability  
of special expertise may continue as a reason for private delegation .... Persons with certain  
kinds of expertise may be too expensive for government to employ or may prefer less structured  
work environments than government can offer. Private delegation may be a practical method of  
obtaining that sort of otherwise unavailable expertise.").  
88 
 See generally Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U.L. RE^. 543, 546-49  
(2000) (discussing the private sector's participation in governance).  
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which is promulgated by a private association . 89  Similarly, most states  
have enacted portions of the model codes drafted by the American  
Law Institute or the National Conference of Commissions on Uniform  
State Laws. Such adoptions turn "a technical and complex task often  
quite beyond the competence of many city councils or even state leg-
islatures over to a specialized private group." 90 And by adopting into  
law the guidelines of a specialized trade association or think-tank, gov-
ernments gain the work product of industry experts without spending  
time or money to understand the intricacies of a specialized field or to  
maneuver a technically complex bill through the legislative process.  
These laws survive constitutional scrutiny only because they adopt  
a particular version  of a private organization's technical code. 91 This ver-
sion-specific—or reproductive—adoption is different than an adoption  
of any guidelines the organization may promulgate in the future. The  
distinction is critical. 92 When state legislatures adopt a specific ver-
sion of privately developed standards into law, they do not transfer any  
future lawmaking power to the private sector. Such legislative action  
is similar to passing a law that a lobbyist or concerned citizen drafted.  
By contrast, when legislatures adopt a non-specific version of privately  
developed standards, they  de facto codify any and all future laws that  
a lobbyist or citizen writes. The difference is who exercises the final  
lawmaking power: the government must retain control over what stan-
dards ultimately become law.  
Put within the context of green building policy, governments  may  
adopt statutes requiring builders to comply with "LEED version 2.1," 93 
for example, but they  may not adopt statutes requiring builders to com-
ply with "LEED standards  ."94  In other words, if states or localities  
adopt a particular version of the LEED rating system, then they enact  
into law a static, fixed set of rules, much like when they adopt a portion  
of the most recent Model Penal Code. But by adopting "LEED stan-
dards" generally, governments enact no rules at all; rather, they enact a  
dynamic set of guidelines that the USGBC may unilaterally alter in the  
future. To remain on constitutionally firm footing, then, legislatures  
19 
 See  Lawrence, supra  note 72, at 689 (describing the states' delegation of lawmaking power to the  
National Fire Protection Agency).  
90 Id. 
91 
 E.g., State v. Crawford, 177 P. 360 (Kan. 1919).  
92 
 This distinction may also explain why courts have declared wage reference statutes to be  
unconstitutional delegations of lawmaking power.  See supra notes 61-63 and accompanying text.  
93 
 See, e.g. , CALABASAS, CAL., MUN. CODE tit. 17, § 17.34.010 (2010) ("The city will use the  
Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design rating system ... to assess the environmental  
sensitivity of new structures in the city that is subject to this chapter.  The Calabasas-LEED system 
is the United States Green Building Council's LEED Rating System V^rsion 8.9 .") (emphasis added).  
94 
 Statutes that require compliance with "LEED standards" may also be unlawfully vague.  Cf.  
JULIAN CONRAD JUERGENSMEYER & THOMAS E. ROBERTS, LAND USE PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT  
REGULATION LAW 522-23 (2d ed. 2007) ("Building and development codes can be challenged on the  
basis that they are so vague that they constitute an unlawful delegation of legislative power.").  
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should avoid broad language requiring compliance with "LEED stan-
dards" and should instead require compliance with a specific version  
of the LEED rating system.  
But even this solution falls short of fully returning green building  
laws to a healthy democratic process because it provides little opportu-
nity for constituents to influence the substantive terms of the ultimate  
policy. An even better legislative paradigm would be for governments  
to use a particular LEED version as a model code and then amend those  
green building standards to better reflect the interests of their constitu-
ents. 95 This method has the additional benefit of permitting legislatures  
to consider the unique zoning, demographic, and geographic demands  
of their jurisdictions when setting targets for sustainable construction. 96 
By doing so, the government would design a unique green building  
statute that uses the USGBC's expertise without deferring to the judg-
ments of a private actor at the expense of an open, transparent, and  
participatory lawmaking process . 97  
CONCLUSION 
Conceptually, green building laws are good public policy. They not  
only promote environmental conservation, they also create jobs and  
strengthen the long-term outlook of the economy. 98 But legislators must  
carefully fashion these statutes. By requiring construction projects to  
satisfy "LEED standards," some green building laws remove political  
accountability, transparency, and legitimacy from the legislative pro-
cess and unconstitutionally delegate public power to the private sec-
tor. In order to return these laws to sound constitutional footing, state  
legislatures should delegate their standard-setting power to a public  
agency, adopt into law a specific version of the LEED rating system, or  
use the system as a starting point for the development of jurisdiction-
specific green building policies. Only then can states reap the benefits  
95 
 Cf. 
 Carl J. Circo, Using Mandates and Incentives To Promote Sustainable Construction and Green 
Building Projects in the Private Sector: A Call for More State Land Use Policy Initiatives , 112 PENN 
Sr. L. REv. 731, 763 (2008) (explaining that "LEED standards are only intended to be relevant  
in limited circumstances," and noting that some green building policies are "unsuitable"  
for all building codes); Kingsley,  supra  note 20, at 547-49 (explaining the downside of  
inflexible green building standards, including a "negative effect[] on development").  
96 
 An example of this "model code" approach is Indianapolis, Indiana, which permits developers  
to receive a 30 percent rebate if they incorporate certain green building technologies, yet does not  
require compliance with the full ambit of LEED standards. Indianapolis Green Building Incentive  
Policy, INDY.GOv, Aug. 1, 2010, http://www.indy.gov/eGov/City/DCE/Documents/Indianapolis%20  
Green%20Building%20Incentive%20Policy%20-%20Updated%208-01-10.pdf. 
 
97 Cf. Schindler, supra note 50, at 342 ("Encouraging local governments to design their own green  
building regimes, which take into account their own localities' concerns and desires, will help  
to achieve the regime goal of legitimate process, resulting in greater public notice, incentive to  
participate, and voice.").  
96 
 See, e.g. , Press Release, USGBC, New Study: Green Building To Support Nearly 8 Million U.S.  
Jobs Over Next 4 Years (Nov. 11, 2009) ("[G]reen building will support 7.9 million U.S. jobs and  
pump $554 billion into the American economy ... over the next four years.").  
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of sustainable construction without compromising the democratic val-
ues that underlie the American system of government.  
